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The objectives of a public sector management  *  Establish financial targets for, and reduce
program should be to use resources more  govemment transfers to, public enterprises.
efficiently, rationalize public sector operations,
and reduce financial disequilibrium.  *  Improve service delivery.
Baran recommends that Honduran authori-
ties prepare an action plan for improving public  *  Implement a well-defined privatization pro-
sector management.  That plan should include  gram.
measures to:
* Prepare and implen- nt a growth-oriented
* Increase savings.  and financially feasible public investment pro-
gram.
* Introduce efficiency-saving measures.
* Improve  dlecisionmaking  and increase  a~c-
* Improve budgeting, debt management, and  countability and autonomy in public enterprises.
tax collection.
* Improve  coordination  of the sector.
- Standardize accounting practices and prop-
erly account for debt service obligations.  * Target subsidies.
* Start external management audits of enter-  * Produce better financial information on the
prises.  public sector.
This paper is a product of the Country Operations Division, Latin America and the
Caribbean Department II.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Tipawan Watana, room 18-155,
extension 31882 (35 pages with tables).
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1.  This  Memorandum  presents  a comprehensive  policy  program  to improve
public  finances  in  Honduras. 1 In  view  of the  administrative  limitations,
the  implementation  of the  proposed  program  would  need to  be phased  over
time  and  a timetable  has to  be developed  for  its  execution. This  report
does  not  propose  a timetable  for  execution  of  the  proposed  program,  but
recommends  that  such  a  program  be developed  in  a follow-up  report. The
report  presents  both  a short-term  action  plan  to  reduce  the  public  sector
deficit  as  well  as a  medium-term  program  to improve  public  finances. The
report  discusses  issues  and  makes  suggestions  regarding  taxes,
expenditures,  including  the  public  investment  program,  and  major  public
sector  enterprises.
A.  Backaround
2.  Honduras  is  a poor  country. Its  per  capita  income  is  the  second
lowest  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  very close  to subsistence  levels.
Malnutrition  is severe. The  literacy  rate  is less  than  60Z. About  half
the  population  is  without  safe  water  and  three  quarters  of the  households
are  without  access  to sanitary  waste  facilities  and  electricity.
3.  The  country  has  also  been  facing  a  major  external  and internal
macro  disequilibria  since  1980.  The  deficit  in  the  current  account  of the
balance  of payments  and  the  Central  Government  finances  reached  about  102
of GDP  until  1985. With the  completion  of the  El Cajon  hydro-electric
project,  the  overall  public  sector  deficit  fell  in 1987  to 5S  of GDP  on  a
cash  basis. Public  savings  amounted  to only  0.4Z  of GDP. Large  USAID
transfers  and  disbursements  for  the  El Cajon  project  financed  a large  part
of the  deficits  in the  public  sector  as  well  as the  current  account  of the
balance  of payments  until  the  last  several  years.
4.  The  macro  disequilibria  worsened  in 1987. With external  financing
tied  to El  Cajon  no longer  available  and  net  external  transfers  abroad
averaging  2Z of GDP,  monetary  aggregates  grew  substantially.  The  monetary
expansion  put  severe  pressure  on the  domestic  price  level. The
expansionary  monetary  growth,  in turn,  began  to threaten  the  fixed  exchange
rate  and  domestic  inflation--kept  at  very low  levels  in  the  past--started
to rise,  albeit  still  at a relatively  low  level  of  3-4.51  p.a.
5.  In the  absence  of a substantial  further  reduction  in the  public
sectur  deficit,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  domestic  inflation  could  be  kept
to historically  low  levels. Hence,  the  maintenance  of present  policies
implies  an increased  public  sector  deficit,  higher  domestic  inflation,  an
enlarged  deficit  in  the  current  account  of the  balance  of payments  and  a
likely  default  on external  debt  obligations.  The  resulting  financial
disequilibrium  will likely  have an  adverse  effect  on  domestic  economic
activity. Furthermore,  mounting  pressures  on  the  official  exchange  rate
will likely  make it  virtually  impossible  to  keep  the  official  nominal
t/ Public  Sector  includes  the  Central  Government,  public  enterprises  and
municipalities.-2
exchange  rate  constant. Since  the  political  costs  under  this  scenario
(i.e.  owing  to  high inflation,  lower  economic  activity  and  high
unemployment)  will be large,  the  authorities  would  likely  be tempted  to
take  corrective  actions.
B.  Impact  of  Macro  Developments  on Public  Sector  Finances
6.  There  is  a close  association  among  the  macro  framework  and  public
sector  finances. Macro  developments  would  have  an impact  on  public
finances  and similarly  corrective  fiscal  measures  would  have repercussions
on  macro  developments.  This  report  assumes  that  the  authorities  introduce
a  medium-term  program  to raise  economic  growth  and  maintain  financial
stability.
7.  Under  one  scenario  with adjustment  measures,  favorable  macro
developments  will likely  tend  to expand  public  sector  savings. High  growth
in GDP  and  the  recovery  of trade  volumes  would  lead  to increased  public
revenues  while low  domestic  inflation  would  likely  reduce  the  pressure  on
raising  public  expenditures.
8.  Under  the  case  without  adjustment  measures,  however,  macro
developments  would  likely  lead  to a decrease  in  public  sector  savings. Low
economic  activity  and  reduced  trade  volumes  would  result  in a decline  of
public  revenues,  while  increased  domestic  inflation  would  lead  to increased
pressures  on the  authorities  to expand  public  programs  as a counter-
cyclical  tool.
II.  PUBLIC  SECTOR  FINANCES
9.  To  confront  the  issues  in  public  sector  finances,  the  authorities
need  to define  a  medium-term  program. These  actions  would  be aimed  at
correcting  the  present  financial  disequilibrium  as  well as addressing
public  sector  management  issues. The  elements  of a  proposed  program  in
public  finances  are  described  in  each  section,  following  a discussion  of
issues  in  the  sector. The  goals  of such  a program  could  includes
(i)  increasing  mobilization  of fiscal  resources;
(ii) allocating  public  resources  to  high  priority  uses (i.e.  both
current  and  capital  expenditures);
(iii) eliminating  financial  disequilibrium,  and
(iv) improving  the  efficiency  of the  provision  of services.
A.  The  Tax  System
10.  The  tax  system  in  Honduras  is  characterized  by a dependence  on
indirect  and  mainly  on trade  related  taxes  (Table  1).  Some  taxes  have
specific  rates  and  hence,  their  base  has  been  eroded  through  accumulated
domestic  inflation  over  the  years. Dependence  on trade  taxes  increases  the
vulnerability  of the  system  to exogenous  price  swings,  leading  to fiscal
problems  as terms  of trade  deteriorate.  The  existence  of a large  number  of
exemptions  also leads  to losses  of fiscal  revenues. As a result,  the  tax
ratio  rose  only  by 0.9  percentage  points  of GDP  in five  years  to 13.7Z  in
1987.  This ratio  is  not  high  compared  to countries  at Honduras's  level  of
development.- 3 -
Table  lt Central  Govornment  Curront  Revenues.  1982-87
(Millions  of  t)  ^/
1982  1998  1984  1986  1986  1987
Tax  Revenues  716.4  711.0  681.1  986.9  997.1  1,097.1
Direct  Tixee  208.2  197.8  241.9  249.4  269.6  297.1
Incom  Tax  198.8  190.8  288.9  240.6  250.2  286.7
Property  Tax  7.4  7.0  8.0  8.8  8.8  10.4
Indirect  Taxes  509.2  618.7  689.4  786.6  788.8  80a.0
Taxes  on  Domestic  Transactions  280.1  226.1  284.7  820.8  828.2  858.6
Tax  on  production,  consumption
and  sales  211.8  205.7  249.9  278.1  285.5  801.8
Boer  86.9  85.0  48.8  47.7  47.7  60.9
Soft  Drinks  10.4  10.1  11.2  12.8  18.1  16.8
Liquors  26.1  28.6  28.8  28.6  28.9  27.2
Petroleum  Products  14.6  16.2  17.0  17.0  17.7  19.9
Cigarettes  81.2  26.1  81.8  a8.2  88.7  88.6
Sales  Tax  91.6  87.2  116.0  129.2  184.9  148.4
Other  Consumption  Taxes  1.6  2.8  8.8  6.1  8.5  7.0
Others  18.8  20.4  84.8  47.6  46.7  62.8
Taxes  on International  Transactions  279.1  287.6  864.7  416.9  410.4  446.4
Imports  178.2  201.5  268.8  816.6  801.1  887.4
Export  98.2  77.8  87.8  92.5  108.4  100.0
Bananas  45.4  84.9  86.8  41.8  88.1  89.6
Coffee  40.8  85.8  42.8  45.8  62.6  62.6
Other*  7.0  7.6  7.7  5.9  4.7  7.8
Others  7.7  8.8  8.6  6.8  6.9  9.0
Non-Tax  Revenues  64.7  67.1  68.8  78.2  164.6  171.2
Services  10.2  14.2  18.4  14.6  16.1  16.0
Transfers  from  rest  of  the
Public  Sector  17.0  Ir  a  17.8  18.2  18.5  17.1
Qovernmnt  Fees,  Othor  Services  6.7  6.6  7.8  6.8  6.4  6.6
Other  Income  11.9  24.2  15.4  21.9  106.8  182.6
Petroleum  (-)  (12.4)  (6.7)  (11.1)  (90.1)  (120.7)
Others  (11.9)  (11.8)  (8.7)  (10.8)  (16.2)  (11.9)
Other  Non-Tax  Revenues  8.9  7.2  11.9  17.2  8.8  -
CURRENT  REVENUES  770.1  778.1  949.6  1,064.1  1,151.7  1,268.t
Source: Ministry  of Finance,  Bank  Staff  Estimates.
3/  t  a  lempiras-4-
AlI.  Income  Tax
11.  The income  tax  gknerates  about  one-fourth  of total  tax revenues.
This  tax  has a large  number  of exemptions. The collection  effort  for  the
income  tax  has  been  very  ws k.  The  maximum  marginal  rate is  402 for
incomes,  exceeding  t  10  ml.ion  (t  - lempiras,  US$1  - t  2).
12.  Conclusions. In  the short-term,  the  collection  effort  haa to be
intensified,  but existing  rates  should  not be increased  to avoid  a
recessionary  impact.
A.2.  Propertv  Taxes
13.  Collection  from  this  tax  has  been limited,  averaging  only  0.81  of
total  Central  Government  current  revenues  in 1987.  The tax  suffers  from
outdated  valuations,  the  absence  of forceful  enforcement  and the  lack  of a
cadaster.
14.  Conclusions. In  view of  the lack  of  a cadaster  and  of up-to-date
valuations,  collections  can  not be expected  to increase  substantially  in
the short-term. However,  for  the longer-term,  it is suggested  that  the
Government  prepare  a cadaster  and  update  valuations  with a view to
increasing  collections.
A.3.  Sales  Tax
15.  The sales  tax is  levied  on  both domestic  and 4.mported  goods  at a
flat  51 rate--except  for  tobacco,  which  is taxed  at 101.  The tax is  mostly
evaded  by store  owners,  who generally  collect  the  tax from  customers  but  do
not pay the  Treasury. A 5S  tax rate  should  provide  sufficient  incentives
to intensify  collection  efforts. However,  consideration  has to  be given  to
increasing  the  rate  to 71  or perhaps  10? to reduce  projected  fiscal
deficits  to sustainable  levels  in the  next several  years.  Compared  to
other  developing  countries,  the rate  of the  tax is low (Table  2).  It  also
has a number  of  exemptions. Moreover,  the  Government  may set  the  tax  on
the  basis  of the  physical  characteristics  of the  establishments  that  are
indicative  of their  sales  volume  (e.g.  size  of store,  number  of employees).
Collection  for  this  tax  has averaged  less  than  22 of  GDP or about  121  of
Central  Government  current  revenues  in  the recent  past.  This  compares
unfavorably  with other  developing  countries.











T-ilue  added  tax  or  a  sales  tax.
J  Only thoso  countries  with  a  single  rate  *re  included  In  the  table.16.  Conclusion. It is suggested  that  the  authoritio"s  consider
increasing  the  rate  of this  tax. Depending  on the  rate  of increase--which
could  vary  within  a range  of 22 to 52--collection  for  this  tax  would
provide  a significant  level  of revenues. Coupled  with  an improved  tax
collection  effort,  this  source  could  generate  a  major  share  of the  needed
revenues  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit. For  the  longer-term,  it is
suggested  that  the  authorities  convert  this  tax  into  a value  added  tax,
which  could  provide  additional  incentives  for  the  private  sector  to  comply.
A.4.  Excise  Taxes
17.  These  taxes  are  confined  to a small  number  of commodities,
including:  beer,  soft  drinks,  liquors,  petroleum  products  and  cigarettes.
Their  rates  are  mostly  specific. With increased  domestic  inflation,
collections  from  these  taxes  fell  from  2.12  of  GDP in 1982  to 1.8S  in  1987.
18.  Conclusion.  It is suggested  to  convert  the  outdated  excise  taxes
into  selective  consumption  taxes  at ad-valorem  rates. Luxury  items  could
be subject  ;o  higher  rates. The  product  coverage  of  the  tax  could  also  be
expanded. The  rates  under  this  tax  should  be the  same  for  goods  of both
domestic  and  imported  origin. The  determination  of rates  under  this  tax
should  also  be coordinated  closely  with suggested  changes  in import
tariffs. Rates  could  be differentiated  within  a range. It is suggested
not  to introduce  very  high  rates,  as these  might  lead  to  increased  evasion.
However,  cars  could  be taxed  at high  rates  to reduce  import  demand  and  to
generate  fiscal  revenues.
A.5.  Taxes  on Imports
19.  A large  share  of taxes  is  collected  from  taxes  on imports.
Between  1982-87,  taxes  on imports  rose,  reflecting  the  increase  in the
value  of imports  and  the  introduction  in  1984  of the  52 customs  fee. As a
result,  the  effective  import  tax  rose  from  122  in  1983  to  about  162  in
1986.
20.  Honduras  has a  complicated  system  of tariffs  and  surcharges,  with
a combination  of taxes  and  surcharges  levied  on imports. A substantial
portion  of revenues  from  imports  is  derived  from  surcharges.  In 1985,  for
example,  revenues  from  import  tariffs  amounted  to  t80  million,  while  those
from  surcharges  equaled  t221  million.
21.  Import  tariffs  were  modified  in  1987  in line  with the  changes
introduced  to the  Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  tariff  system. As
a result,  all  specific  rates  were eliminated,  with rates  converted  into  an
ad-valorem  basis,  and  the  nomenclature  was changed  from  the  Central
American  classification  scheme  into  that  of Brussels. The  following  table
presents  the  parameters  for  the  new tariff  regime:-6-
Table  3: Parameters  for  the  Now  Tarlff  Realme  1937
Ittmo  Rates
Inputs  1J
Inputs  for  agricultural  products  6X
Capital goods  6%
Final  consumer  coods  2/  bo  - 90X
1  Minimum  rate.
J  Medicino  and  nome  other  health  products  are taxed at  IX.
Sourco:  Ministry  of  Finance.
22.  The  tariffs  range  between  1Z - 90Z. High  rates  are  applied  for
shoes,  garments  and  few  other  final  consume-:  goods--for  which  there  is
domestic  production.  Furthermore,  more than  one  rate  applies  to some
products  depending  on their  end-use.
23.  Three  decrees  define  surcharges,  which  are  levied  on a CIF  basis.
They  provide  high  and  dispersed  nominal  and  hence  effective  protection  to
the  industrial  sector. With  surcharges,  the  maximum  tariff  rate  equals
125Z.  The  following  table  indicates  the  different  rates  of surcharges  and
the  decrees  which  provide  the  legal  framework  for  those  charges:
Table 4:  Rates of  Surcharges. 1988
Decree No.  Itemo  X
Decree  No.  64  Inputs  650
Final  consumer  products  10.0
Docroe  No.  85/4  All  products  10.0
Decree  No.  59  All  products  20-0
Source:  Ministry  of  Finance.
24.  Collections  from  imports  are  reduced,  however,  owing  to  the
existence  of  a large  number  of exemptions.  Over 40  laws  regulate  the
granting  of exemptions  under  imports. As a result,  only  about  one-fourth
of imports  are subject  to  tariffs,  leading  to  a fiscal  revenue  loss  of
about  22 of  GDP  annually. About  one-quarter  of imports  generate  virtually
all  revenues  from  imports. The  exemptions  increase  une  level  of effective
protection  for  industry  and  raise  variability  in  both  nominal  and in
effective  protection.
25.  A large  number  of products  and  institutions  are  exempted  from  the
payment  of import  duties. These  include:  agriculture  inputs,  publicsector  imports,  and  inputs  for  various  industries.  Exemptions  granted  to
public  sector  imports  account  for  about  one-fifth  of  all  exemptions,  and
public  sector  enterprises  account  for  about  two-thirds  of the  exemptions
granted  to the  public  sector.
Conclusions
26.  Rationalization  of the  tariff  regime  will likely  take  time. At
present,  the  main objective  of the  import  regime  is  to generate  government
revenues,  while  dampening  import  demand  and  protecting  the  domestic
industry. It is  desirable  that  at the  final  stage  of the  reform  process,
the  parameters  of the  tariff  structure  resemble  the  targets  whit-  he other
Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)  members  aim  at  achieving  he
medium-term. In this  context,  a  maximum  and  unified  tariff  rat.,  if  202
should  be the  long-term  goal.
27.  As a first  step,  however,  it is suggested  to  phase  out
quantitativf  tmport  restrictions  on imports  and  replace  them  with tariffs.
At a fixed  e4charige  rate,  nominal  tariffs  would  need to  be raised  to avoid
a sharp  increase  in imparts. Under  a flexible  exchange  rate  policy,  the
exch.ange  rate  needs  to  be deprecialed  in real  terms. However,  if  the
Government  does  not introduce  a compensatory  devaluation,  then  the  process
of tariff  liberalization  has  to  be slowed  down. Given  that  the  tariff
equivalent  of quantitative  restrictions  is difficult  to  estimate,  there  is
a danger  that  the  higher  tariffs  are  not  subsequently  reduced  following  the
substitution  of  quantitative  restrictions  by tariffs. To avoid  this
scenario  from  happening,  the  Govarnment  needs  to  define  its  medium-term
goal  of reducing  tariffs  over  time.  Secondly,  it is  suggested  that  a
process  be started  to  phase  out  exemptions  on import  tariffs.
28.  The  first  stage  of  the  reform  process  should  attempt  to
rationalize  the  tariff  system  by  making  it  more transparent  as  well as  to
generate  higher  levels  of government  revenues  both  through  a reduction  in
exemptions  as  well  as a conversion  of  quantitative  import  restrictions  into
tariffs. It  would  not,  however,  reduce  effective  protection.  The  first
stage  of the  reform  would  be consistent  with the  need  to establish  macro-
financial  stability  and  control  import  demand.
29.  The later  stages  of the  tariff  reform  should  aim  at initially
phasing  out  import  surcharges  and  then  reducing  high tariff  rates. Given
the  small  and  limited  size  of the  private  sector  in  Honduras,  and
consequently  likely  slow  adjur.r3nt  of the  private  sector  to the  changing
signals  in the  economy,  the  adjustment  of the  tariff  regime  will  need  to  be
a slow  process. Furthermore,  changes  in the  tariff  regime  would  need  to  be
coordinated  with  exchange  rate  policy. Hence,  those  changes  should  be
introduced  after  macro-financial  stability  is  established.  Otherwise,
attempting  to do  too  mucai  in  one  step  would  likely  raise  social  and
political  costs  and  would  not likely  be sustainable.  Obviously,  tariffs
can  be reduced  substantially  if  the  exchange  rate  is devalu-ed  at the  same
time.  This  will  also  provide  incentives  to  non-traditional  exports.
30.  Fiscal  implications  of changes  in  the  tariff  regime  should  be
assessed  and  any  expected  shortfall  in  government  revenues  should  be
compensated  for  by additional  public  savings  measures. The  initial  stage
of the  reform  should  not  necessarily  lead  to a loss  of revenues. However,
the  precise  fiscal  impact  of subsequent  steps  of the  reform  is  not  yet- a  -
certain. To the  eutent  that  further  trade  liberalization  is  carried  out
through  increasing  low  tariffs  and  phasing  out  exemptions,  declines  in  high
tariff  rates  sB.  uld  not  necessarily  lead  to  a loss  of revenues. However,
if subsequent  stages  of  the reform  fail  to increase  low  tariff  rates  or to
phase  out  exemptions,  there  will likely  be  a net  loss  in  government
revenues. It is  suggested,  therefore,  that  any  reduction  in  tariff
revenues  owing  to reduced  rates--assuming  that  the  effect  of the  increased
import  volume  will  not change  the  final  outcome--should  be  compensated  for
by additional  savings  measures. Public  savings  could  be enhanced  by
raising  collection  from  sales  tax  through  strengthening  collection  effort
and  raising  the  rate  of the  sales  tax  from  5? to  7Z or  perhaps  to 102.
A.6.  Export  Taxes
31.  About  a tenth  of tax  revenues  was derived  from  export  taxation
dur'.ng  1982-87. Virtually  all  of the  collection  from  export  taxes  is
obtained  from  coffee  and  bananas. These  taxes  can  be considered  quasi-
income  taxes  on  coffee  and  banana  farmers  since  income  taxes  collected  from
plantations  growing  these  two  crops  are  low.
32.  The  authorities  modified  the  tax  on coffee  in 1988,  reducing  the
minimum  international  price  below  which  exports  of coffee  will  not  be
taxable. The  minimum  taxable  price  was set  at  US$1.20  per  pound. If the
international  price  drops  below  US$1.20,  the  revenues  will l:ikely  drop  by
about  t50-60  million  (i.e.,  US$25-30  million)  a year.
33.  Conclusion. In  view  of  the  need to  maintain  revenutes  from  coffee
exports,  it  is suggested  to  lower  the  minimum  price  limit  on coffee
exports. For  the  medium-term,  it is  important  to restructure  the  coffee
export  tax  along  the  lines  of the  Costa  Rican  coffee  export  tax,  which  has
a graduated  rate  structure,  with  higher  international  prices  taxed  at
higher  rates,  enabling  the  Government  to  benefit  from  windfall  gains.
A.7.  Petroleum  Differential  Tax
34.  The  Government  taxes  petroleum  products  through  a  petroleum  price
differential  tax. This  tax  is  levied  on the  difference  between  the
domestic  and  international  price  of  petroleum  in  domestic  currency. As the
international  price  of oil  dropped  sharply  in 1986,  domestic  prices  were
not reduced,  thus  leading  to  a significant  increase  in collection  of this
tax,  which rose  from  tll.5  million  (US$5.8  million)  in 1985  to  t90.1
million  (US$45  million)  in 1986.
35.  Conclusion.  The  authorities  expect  to  collect  about  tlOO-120
million  from  this  source  in 1988/89. In the  short-term,  it is  suggested
not to reduce  domestic  petroleum  prices  to generate  government  revenues  as
well as to encourage  fuel  savings. Furthermore,  continuous  changes  in
domestic  prices  are  not  politically  feasible.  Moreover,  the  large
depeneence  of  Government  revenues  on this  volatile  source  (i.e.  this  tax
generated  about  8.51  of current  Central  Government  revenues  in 1987)
underscores  the  need  to  undertake  a tax  reform,  aimed  principally  at
shifting  the  burden  of taxation  from  international  trade  to domestic
sources  (i.e.  see  Working  Paper  on "Harmonizing  Taxes  in  Central  America"
for  a  more detailed  analysis).-9-
A.8.  Tax  Administration
36.  The  authorities  believe  that  there  is  a high  degree  of  evasion  of
all  taxes  owing  mostly  to  weak administration  and  to  the  limited  number  of
contributors  under  the  income  and  domestic  transaction  taxes. Of the  total
population  of about  4.2  million  in  Honduras,  there  are  only  160,000
contributors,  of  which  less  than  half  actually  pay their  income  taxes. It
is further  believed  that  a large  number  of stores  collect  domestic
transaction  taxes  (i.e.  sales  and  excise  taxes),  but  they  do not  report
these  collections  to the  Government.  The  lack  of sufficient  logistical
support  (i.e.  computers)  also  hinders  effective  monitoring.
37.  Conclusion. It is  suggested  to intensify  efforts  at tax
collection,  and  mainly  on those  taxes  which  could  generate  large
collections  such  as ineume  and  sales  taxes. USAID  is assisting  the
Government  in  tightening  tax  collection  procedures.  However,  efforts  need
to be intensified  on the  following  areas:
*i)  improving  taxpayer  identification  (the  major  thrust  of the
effort  should  be on better  monitoring  of large  producers,
importers  and  corporations);
(ii) increasing  the  number  of tax-payers;  and
(iii) providing  better  logistical  support  to tax  administration  in
the  Ministry  of Finance.
A.9.  Customs
38.  The  authorities  believe  that  there  is  a  high  degree  of evasion  of
custom  duties. The  main  fpctors  behind  this  evasion  are  believed  to
include:  (i)  the  lack  of sufficient  training  of the  officials  at the  ports
and  customs,  especially  regarding  valuation  of items;  (ii)  the  lack  of
adequate  logistical  support  such  as equipment,  labs  etc;  and (iii)  the
existence  of  bribery. To address  these  issues,  it is suggested  that
technical  assistance  be extended  to the  Government  to  provide  training,
logistical  support  and  to strengthen  monitoring  of customs.
A.10.  Overall  Conclusions  on the  Tax  System
39.  Rationalization  and  modernization  of the  tax  system  is urgently
needed. Toward  this  end,  the  authorities  need  to focus  on increasing  the
mobilization  of fiscal  resources,  changing  the  structure  of taxes  to  make
them  more  elastic  to  economic  growth,  reducing  the  vulnerability  of the  tax
system  to exogeneous  price  shocks  and  shifting  the  burden  from  income  to
domestic  transact..on  taxes. In  carrying  out  these  reforms,  there  is  a  need
for:  (i)  coordinating  planned  changes  with  the  efforts  under  the  trade
reform;  (ii)  minimizing  adverse  effects  on  economic  activity;
(iii)  simplifying  the  tax  system;  and (iv)  reducing  exemptions  both  under
the  corporate  income  tax  as  well  as under  imports.
40.  Changes  in the  tax  system  will.nv,bably  not  be politically
popular. First,  Congressional  approval  of  changes  may  prove  to be
difficult. Second,  an increase  in rates  could  encourage  evasion. In fact,
without  ctrengthening  the  tax  administration,  it is  possible  that  actual
tax  collections  could  decline  following  a rise  in rates._  10  -
B.  Central  Government  Expenditures
41.  Central  Government  expenditures  grew  at about  102  a year  during
1982-87. This  growth  masks  the  changing  composition  of expenditures,  since
capital  expenditures  (i.e.  mostly  transfers  to  ENEE)  fell  while  current
expenditures  rose.
B.1.  Introduction
42.  The  current  structure  of expenditures  presents  rigidities.  As a
result,  the  scope  for  decreasing  expenditures  within  a possible  adjustment
program  will likely  be  minor. For  example,  interest  payments  almost
tripled  in  real  terms  during  1981-1987  and  accounted  for  about  16Z  of
current  expenditures  in  1987,  while  expenditures  on defense  equalled  7.8Z
of the  total  in  1987 (Table  5).  It is  generally  believed  that  expenditures
related  to defense  are  distributed  among  various  categories  such  as  wages
and  salaries,  debt  service,  investment,  and  goods  and  services. Total
military  expenditures  are  believed  to  have amounted  to 232  of current
revenues  in 1987. Given  the  sensitive  border  problems,  defense
expenditures  may  prove  to  be difficult  to reduce  in  the  short-term.
Furthermore,  expenditures  on  the  social  sectors  remained  at one-third  of
the  total  during  the  period. This  is  mostly  due  to  high  education
expenditures  (i.e.  mostly  for  teacher  salaries).  As a result,  the  share
allocated  to infrastructure,  mostly  for  transport  and  natural  resources
which  the  country  badly  needs,  declined  over  the  years.
Table  5:  Central Sovornment  Expenditures by Function.  1981-87
(X  of  total)
1981  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986  198
Administrative  Expenditures  20.0  17.0  16.8  17.4  19.9  14.7  14.6
Social  Sectors  85.6  84.8  82.7  30.7  80.4  82.6  82.2
o/w Education  (20.2)  (21.2)  (19.7)  (19.7)  (20.1)  (20.8)  (20.8)
o/w H-  Ith  (11.2)  (10.8)  (10.4)  (11.0)  (8.8)  (9.8)  (9.6)
Infrastructure  16.2  18.7  12.8  10.a  9.1  11.8  10.6
o/w Transport  and  Communications  (9.0)  (7.3)  (6.8)  (6 7)  (4.8)  (5.6)  (6.8)
@/w  Natural  Resources  (7.2)  (6.4)  (6.8)  (4.6)  (4.8)  (6.7)  (4.8)
Defonse  1386  18.1  12.4  14.0  14.0  18.0  7.8
Debt Service  2  16.8  21.4  26.7  27.8  26.6  28.4  84.8
100.0  100.0  160.6  160.6  106.6  100.0  160.0
Source:  Ministry  of  Finance.
1  Budgeted.
J  Includes  amortization  psyments.  Tho] Ministry  of  Finance classiflos  amortization
paymonts  as exponditures and it  was not  possible  at  this  timo  to  difforentiate
Interest  from amortization  payments  In this  table.- 11 -
43.  Conclusions. Any fiscal  adjustment  effort  would  need to  aim  at
reducing  the growth  of the  non-interest  expenditures  of the  Central
Government. This  goal  can  be achieved  through  a decrease  in the  wage  bill
and transfers  to  public  sector  enterprises,  economizing  on expenditures  on
goods  and services,  and introducing  cost-effective  programs. In terms  of
functional  distribution,  further  growth  in  military  expenditures  needs  to
be restrained. Reductions  in  the  wage bill  will likely  require  retiring
personnel  and revising  wage policy. Both  actions  are likely  to  prove  to  be
politically  difficult  to  carry  out.  But,  these  actions  are  indispensable
for  achieving  fiscal  austerity. In this  respect,  the authorities  should
continue  to implement  the  wage freeze  for  public  employees  and  extend  the
freeze  also  to teachers  and  medical  personnel. Obviously,  politically
strong  unions  could  counteract  these  policies.
44.  A large  part  of  Central  Government  spending  goes  to  wages  and
salaries,  averaging  about  45%  of current  expenditures  and  7.7Z  of  GDP
during  1982-87. A significsnt  share  of  wages and s.  laries  are  incurred  in
the  education  sector,  accounting  for  about  one-third  of the  public  wage
bill  in 1986.  The  total  wage  bill  grew  as public  employment  jumped  from
67,000  in 1982  to  about  72,000  in 1986. About  one-third  of public
employees  were teachers  in  1986.
45.  Transfers  also  constitute  a  major  source  of Government  outlays
(Tables  6 and 7).  A large  part  of these  transfers  go to  public  sector
enterprises,  averaging  about  171  of total  Central  Govern,ment  outlays  and
about  42 of  GDP a year  during  1984-87. Transfers  to  National  Electricity
Company  (ENEE),  National  Water  and Sewerage  Service  Company (SANAM),  and
National  Agrarian  Institute  (INA)  comprised  a large  share  of those
transfers  over  the last  couple  of years. El Cajon  was the  major recipient
of capital  transfers,  while  current  transfers  went rostly  to the
universities  and INA.
Tabl-  6: Contral Government  Current Transfer.  to
the  Rot  of  the  Public Sector. 1984-86
(millions  of  t)
1984  1985  1996
Public  Sector  Enterprises  89.8  106.9  128.5
INA  (25.4)  (80.6)  (81.9)
NIAN  (48.1)  (67.9)  (7.56)
JNBS  (9.1)  (10.4)  (18.2)
Municipalities  *.6  0.5  0.6
Others  12.9  86.8  81.2
Total  Public  Sector  102.7  187.2  166.2
Memorandum  Item
Total  current  transfers
as a  of  GDP  1.6  2.0  2.1
Source:  Central  Bonk of  Honduras.- 12 -
Table 7: Central  Government  Capital  Transfers  to
the  Rest  of  the  Public  Sector.  1984-86
(mililons  of  t)
1984  1986  1986
Public  Sector  Enterprises  197.4  118.8  59.4
ENEE  (142.8)  (80.9)  (18.2)
INA  (18.2)  (4.0)  (12.6)
SANAA  (14.0)  (16.8)  (20.8)
HONDUTEL  (4.2)  (-)  (-)
INVA  (1.7)  (2.2)  (2.8)
INMA  (9.8)  (6.6)  (-)
COHDEFOR  (-)  (2.0)  (8.6)
INCAFE  (8.8)  (-)  (1.2)
Others  (8.9)  (1.9)  (0.8)
Municipalities  9.8  12.8  10.0
Others  _  2.0  3.6
Total  Public  Sector  206.7  128.1  78.0
=  ==  3
Memorandum  Item
Total  capital  transfers
*  a X of CDP  3.3  2.0  1.0
Source:  Central  Dank  of  Honduras.
3.2.  Education  ExDenditures
46.  Education  expenditures  grew  rapidly  during  1981-86.  About  two-
thirds  of expenditures  were  spent  on wages  and  salaries.  While  there  has
been  a freeze  on public  sector  wages  over  the  last  couple  of years,
teachers  have  consistently  received  salary  increases  well  above  domestic
inflation  each  year.  Investment  expenditures  for  the  sector,  however,  fell
during  this  period.
47.  Central  Government  transfers  covered  over  90Z of the  financial
needs  of the  sector  in the  recent  past, while  user  charges  financed  the
rest.  As  financial  resources  devoted  to investment  contracted,  the quality
of education  also  suffered.
48.  Regarding  the allocation  of expenditures  by branches,  almost  half
of the  total  goes  to primary  education,  while  20Z  of the  total  is allocated
to  secondary  education  and  the  rest  is spent  on universities.  Given  the
difficulties  in raising  user  charges  for primary  and  secondary
education--which  comprise  about  901 of the expenditures  spent  in the
sector--the  scope  for  increasing  savings  through  adjustments  in user
charges  is limited.- 13 -
49.  Conclusions.  Given  the  need to  control  expenditures  and  improve
quality  of education,  savings  could  be generated  by reducing  the  growth  of
salaries  below  domestic  inflation  if  politically  viable. Obviously,
achieving  macro  stability  would  help  moderate  wage increases  by reducing
the  underlying  domestic  inflation  rate.
B.3. Health  Expenditures
50.  Central  Government  expenditures  on  health  have  absorbed  about  one-
tenth  of the  total  during  1982-87. In  addition  to the  Central  Government,
the  Social  Security  Institute  (IHSS)  also  provides  health  services. The
combined  expenditures  on  health  averaged  2.7Z  of  GDP in  1987.
51.  Conclusions.  Given  the  poor  social  indicators  in  Honduras  (i.e.
high  mortality  rate  and low  life  expectancy),  reductions  in  health
expenditures  are  not  desirable. However,  efforts  should  be expedited  to
make those  expenditures  more cost-effective,  while  ensuring  improved
coordination  among  the  Central  Government  and  IHSS.
C.  Central  Government  Finances
52.  After  a deterioration  during  1982-84,  overall  Central  Government
finances  continued  to improve  during  1985-87  (Table  8).  The  fiscal  deficit
fell  from  an  annual  average  of about  10.8Z  of GDP  during  1982-84  to less
than  8.2Z  during  1985-87. However,  the  deficit  in 1987  on an accrual  basis
--at 7.32--was  still  high. The improvement  during  1982-87  reflects  the
effect  of an increase  in revenues  by 2.3  percentage  points  of GDP  to 16.1Z
and  a reduction  in  overall  expenditures  by 0.5  percentage  points  of  GDP  to
23.42. However,  the  decrease  in  expenditures  as a share  of GDP  masks  the
changing  composition  of expenditures,  since  current  expenditures  grew  by 3
percentage  points  of GDP  to 18.5Z,  while  capital  expenditures  fell  by 3.5
percentage  points  of GDP  to 4.9Z. The  sharp  expansion  in  current
expenditures  resulted  mainly  from  wage and  salary  increases  as  well as  a
raise  in  military  outlays. As a result,  Central  Government  current
dissavings  increased  from  1.7Z  in 1982  of  GDP to  2.42  in 1987. The  reduced
capital  expenditures  resulted  not only  from  the  termination  of transfers  to
El Cajon  as  the  project  was completed,  it  also  stemmed  from  a cutback  in
investme.nts  in  transportation  and  agriculture._ 14 -
Tabl-  S: Central  Govornment  Flnances.  1981-87
(X  of  CDP)
1981  1982  1988  1984  1085  1988  1987
Current  Revenues  14.0  18.8  18.0  16.6  10.2  16.6  16.1
Tax  Revenuos  18.1  12.8  12.0  14.0  14.7  18.2  18.7
Non-Tax  Revonues  0.9  1.0  1.6  1.6  1.6  2.4  2.4
Current  Expenditures  16.1  16.6  18.8  17.1  18.6  17.9  18.5
Current  Account  Balance  -1.1  -1.7  -8.2  -1.6  -2.8  -2.8  -2.4
Capiteb  Exoenditures  and  Net
Lending  8.8  8.4  7.4  10.1  7.2  6.6  4.9
Overall  Balanco  (accrual  basis)  -7.9  -10.1  -10.6  -11.7  -9.6  -7.8  -7.3
Overall  Balance  (cash  basis)  -7.9  -10.1  -10.6  -11.7  -9.6  -7.8  -6.7
Not  Extornal  Financing  4.7  4.6  5.1  7.8  4.9  2.7  0.9
Foroign  Assistance!/  0.0  0.6  0.8  1.1  1.7  1.8  1.1
Not  Domestic  Financing  8.2  5.0  5.2  2.8  2.9  8.8  4.0
Bank credit  8.0  4.4  8.0  1.9  1.9  2.8  1.6
Bonds  0.6  0.8  1.5  1.4  0.6  1.0  1.7
Others  -0.4  -0.2  0.7  -0.6  0.6  0.0  0.7
Change  In  Arrears  on  amortization
obilgations  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Honduras,  Ministry  of  Financo,  IMF,  Bank  Staff  Estimates.
/  Mostly  USAID  grants.
D.  Financing  of the  Central  Government  Deficit
53.  As external  assistance  contracted,  domestic  sources  of financing
gained  importance  during  1984-87. Net  external  financing  fell  from  a peak
of 7.8Z  of GDP in  1984  to 0.9X  in 1987,  mostly  as a result  of reduced
capital  inflows. During  this  period,  the  domestic  counterpart  of  USAID
assistance  provided  financing  of the  fiscal  deficit  of  an amount  equal  to
an annual  average  of 1.4X  of GDP.  However,  paralleling  a reduction  in
project  pipeline,  net external  financing  decreased  over  the  years. An
expansion  in the  domestic  sources  financed  a larger  share  of the  deficit  in
the  last  few  years.- 15 -
54.  Increased  domestic  financing  of the  fiscal  deficit  is  risky,  given
its  inflationary  implications.  Continued  high levels  of  Central  Bank
advances  to the  Central  Government  will likely  fuel  domestic  inflation  and
could  start  an inflation-devaluation  spiral  in  a country  which  maintained
fixed  exchange  rate  for  over  60  years. Central  Bank  advances  to the
Central  Government  rose  during  1986-1987.  Of the  total,  almost  half  was
provided  with  no interest  and  the  remainder  at subsidized  interest  rates.
Central  Bank  advances  to  the  Central  Government  were facilitated  by high
reserve  requirements  on commercial  banks. Furthermore,  treasury  bond sales
to the  public  and  to commercial  banks  also  accelerated.  This  increase  was
made  possible  by  maintaining  high interest  rates  on treasury  bills,  with
rates  on these  bills  ranging  between  9Z  and  112  in 1987. As a result,  the
stock  of domestic  debt  continued  to expand  (Table  9).  If  the  rate  of
growth  of debt  is  maintained  at  present  levels,  interest  payments  on the
domestic  debt  would  likely  absorb  a large  share  of  Central  Government
revenues  in the  next few  years.
Table  9:  Debt  Stock  of  tho  Public  Soctor.  1984-88
(mlillione  of  t)
1984  1985  1988
Domestic  External  Domestic  External  Domestic  Externnl
Central  Government  1,699.4  2,278.2  1,837.9  2,615.8  2,088.6  2,878.5
Public  Sector  Institutions  840.9  647.1  929.7  810.2  988.9  902.2
Municipalities  223.8  12.2  230.2  10.4  248.1  9.2
Totel  2,664.1  2,932.6  2,997.8  8,486.4  8,270.6  8,769.9
Memorandum  Item
Total  as  X of  GDP  42.8  46.5  44.6  51.1  43.6  60.6
Source: Central  Bank  of Honduras.
55.  As a result  of liberal  and  excessive  use  of  almost  all  possible
sources  of financing  in  the  past.  few  years,  the  Government  has  virtually
exhausted  all  prudent  forms  of financing  the  fiscal  deficit  for  the  next
several  years. Regarding  external  financing  of the  deficit,  USAID
indicated  that  it  will scale  down  its  transfers  in  the  future. Owing  to
the  completion  of the  El Cajon  hydro-project  and  the  weak  pipeline  of
projects  by the  multilateral  agencies  coupled  with projected  increase  in
amortization  obligations  on external  debt,  net  external  financing  for  the
Central  Government  will  be at reduced  levels  in the  next  several  years. On
the  domestic  side,  further  large  expansions  in  Central  Bank  advances  to  the
public  sector  will likely  fuel  domestic  inflationary  pressures  (Table  10
shows  the financing  of the  public  sector  by the  domestic  monetary  system).- 16 -
If Central  Bank  credit  expansion  is financed  by increasing  reserve
requirements  of the  commercial  banks,  this  could  lead  to reduced  credit
availability  and  higher  domestic  interest  rates,  and  hence  adversely  affect
economic  activity. Excessive  reliance  on borrowing  would  unnecessarily
raise  interest  payments  in the  future,  and  hence  would  result  in  a further
increase  in the  public  sector  deficit. Hence,  the  deficit  should  be
reduced  to levels  which  could  be prudently  financed  by net  disbursements  of
external  loans,  mostly  obtained  at concessional  terms. Based  on IBRD
projections,  this  level  is  projected  at  about  1.51-2Z  of GDP for  1988-90.
The reduction  in  deficit  could  be achieved  through  a  combination  of revenue
increases  and  expenditure  restraint. Specifically,  raising  tax  collection
effort,  increasing  public  utility  prices  should  provide  the  bulk  of savings
effort  in  the  short-term.  Obviously,  any  serious  medium-term  effort  should
focus  on expenditure  reductions  through  elimination  of low-priority
programs,  divestiture  of public  enterprises  and  reduction  of public
employment.
Table  10:  Banking  System  Financing  of the  Public  Sector
As End  of Year.  1983-87
(millions  of t)
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Central  Bank  CreditT
To Public  Sector  619.9  650.9 698.3  622.8 751.3
To Central  Government  530.6 576.9 622.5  628.7  721.3
To Rest  of the  Public  Sector  89.3  74.0  75.8  34.1  30.0
Commercial  Bank  Credit:
To  Public  Sector  349.8 405.9  387.2 491.8  537.9
To  Central  Government  371.2 449.2  517.6 676.7 691.1
To  Rest  of the  Public  Sector  -21.4 -43.3  -130.4  -184.9  -153.2
Source: IMF.
E.  Budaet  for  1988
56.  Table  11 indicates  the  budget  for  1988. Essentially,  this  budget
perpetuates  the  existing  problems  inherited  from  previous  years. Congress
introduced  a large  number  of  modifications  to the  proposed  budget  prepared
by the  Executive  branch  of the  Government.  These  measures  reduced  the
proposed  budgetary  allocations  by about  tl53.0  million,  or about  1.7?  of
GDP,  with about  two-thirds  of it  expected  to  be financed  by external
sources. Congress  also  changed  the  composition  of proposed  expenditures  by
increasing  allocations  for  some  programs,  while  scaling  down  others. For
example,  allocations  for  defense  were increased  from  the  proposed  amounts,
while  some  investments  with  concessional  financing  were reduced. Also- 17  -
subject  to cuts  were some  developmental  investments  such  as those  in
natural  resources  and  transport  and  allocations  for  the  Office  of the
Presidency.  The  modifications  clearly  do not  bring  out  any  clear  picture;
they  are  likely  t.o  lead  to difficulties  in  the  implementation  of the
budget.
Table  11: Budget*d  Expenditures  by  Sector.  1988
(X  of  Totol)
Percont
Administrative  Expenditures  15.60
Soclal  Sector.  82.0
e/w  Education  (19.0)
*/W  HoaI  th  (11.6)
Infrastructure  17.6
o/w  Transport,  Communications  (11.8)
o/w  Natural  Resources  (5.8)
Defense  7.0
Debt  Servic-'/  28.4
Total  100.0
In  millons  of  t  2,168.6
Memorandum  Item
Total  Budgeted  Expenditures
as  X  of  GDP  2.60
Source:  Ministry  of  Planning.
!/  Includes  amortization  payments.
The  Budget  Process
57.  Before  1988,  the  budget  for  the  Central  Government  was  prepared  by
the  Budget  Office  at the  Ministry  of  Finance. In 1988,  the  budget  was
prepared  by the  Ministry  of  Planning  in  order  to ensure  consistency  between
current  and  capital  expenditures  of the  Central  Government.- 18  -
58.  The  budget  process  is  burdened  with  a number  of issues. The
budget  for  the  Central  Government  is  prepared  on the  basis  of existing
programs  irrespective  of  whether  there  still  continues  to  be a need  for
some  of these  programs. As a result,  the  budget  process  perpetuates  the
existing  programs. What is  worse,  almost  all  programs  are  expected  to grow
each  year,  oftentimes  exceeding  domestic  inflation  rate,  thus  resulting  in
a real  increase  in  expenditures  in  most  programs. Within  this  framework,
it is  not  possible  to Reriously  attempt  to  reduce  expenditures.
Furthermore,  since  the  expenditures  of the  rest  of the  public  sector  are
not  planned  through  a consolidated  public  sector  budget,  the  Central
Government  does  not  have  a  powerful  handle  on controlling  expenditures.  As
a result,  the  budgeting  process  has  not  been  used  as a  macroeconomic  tool
to reduce  expenditures  to  adjust  them  to reduced  real  available  resources
when terms  of trade  deteriorate.  Additionally,  budgets  oftentimes  failed
to incorporate  counterpart  funds  for  ongoing  projects,  resulting  in  the
unnecessary  deceleration  of ongoing  public  projects. Lastly,  there  are
structural  rigidities  in the  budget  such  as earmarking  of 6Z of revenues  of
the  Central  Government  for  universities.
59.  Conclusions.  The  implementation  of the  following  actions  on the
part  of the  Government  would  go  a long  way in rationalizing  the  budget
process  and  transforming  it to  be a  macro  tool  for  adjusting  expenditures
as necessary:
si)  involving  the  Ministry  of Finance  in  the  preparation  of the
budget  to  ensure  an improved  coordination  among  the  Ministries
of Planning  and  Finance;
(ii) shifting  to a  zero-based  budgeting  system  on  most  programs--to
the  extent  possible--to  enable  the  Government  to delete  or
reduce  low-priority  programs  from  the  budget;
(iii) preparing  a  consolidated  public  sector  budget  to  ensure  a
better  planning  of expenditures  at the  public  sector  level,
rather  than  only  at the  Central  Government  level  (i.e.,  this
budget  could  initially  cover  the  Central  Government  and  a few
major  public  enterprises  such  as  ENEE,  HONDUTEL  (Honduras
Telecommunications  Company),  SANAA,  INA,  and  COHDEFOR  (Honduras
Forestry  Development  Corporation),  but  it  could  then  be
expanded  to include  most of the  non-financial  public  sector);
(iv) budgeting  adequately  for  the  counterpart  funds  for  public
projects  to ensure  timely  implementation  of public  projects;
and
(v)  ensuring  a close  monitoring  of the  efficiency  with  which
earmarked  funds  are  utilized  by universities.
F. Public  Investment  ProRram
F.1.  Public  Investment  Expenditures
60.  Public  investment  expenditures  averaged  about  9.4Z  of GDP  annually
during  1981-87  (Table  12). After  reaching  levels  of almost  122  of GDP
during  1983-84,  public  investment  expenditures  fell  to an  annual  average  of
7.32  during  1986-87,  following  the  completion  of the  El Cajon  hydro-power- 19  -
project. Expenditures  on  El Cajon  accounted  for  about  half of the  total
public  investment  expenditures  during  1981-85. As a result,  during
1981-85,  over  702  of public  investment  expenditures  were allocated  to
infrastructure,  while  7Z  went  to productive  sectors  and  23Z  to social
sectors.
Table  12: Public  Sector  Invoetm.nt Expenditures. 1981-87
(X of  CDP)
1981  1982  1989  1984  1985  1986  1987
Public  Sector  90.  9.8  11.5  11.9  9.1  7.1  7.6
o/w Pubi c Sector
Enterprises  (5.9)  (6.2)  (7.9)  (8.  1)  (6.2)  (8.  )  (8.9)
Source:  Ministry  of  Planning.
F.2.  Public  Investment  Program  for  1987-90
61.  The  authorities  prepared  a Droposed  investment  program  for
1987-90. Based  on Government  projections,  the  proposed  program  aims  at
recovering  the  share  of public  investment  expenditures  to  an annual  average
of 112  of GDP  during  1988-90. To achieve  this,  the  authorities  plan  to
start  a number  of  new  projects  during  the  proposed  program  period.
62.  Table  13 shows  the  shares  of the  new  and  ongoing  projects  in the
proposed  investment  program. As indicated  in the  table,  about  702  of the
proposed  investment  program  would  consist  of new  projects. The  composition
of the  program  would  also  change,  with the  productive  (i.e.  mostly  in
agriculture)  and  social  sectors  increasing  their  share  of the  total,  while
infrastructure's  share  falling.- 20  -
Table  18: Planned Investment  Program by Sector.  Share of  Oneoine  and  Now
Prolectn  In  Investment Program. 1987-90
(N  of  total)
Ongoing  New
Projects  Prolectn  Total
I.  Productive Sectors
Agriculture  7.7  16.1  28.6
Agrolndustry  0.7  0.6  1.8
Industry  2.7  1.0  8.7
Tourism  0.0  2.6  2.6
Forestry  0.0  0.8  0.8
Fishing  0.0  1.6  1.6
Mining  0.0  0.1  0.1
Sub-total  11.1  22.7  88.6
I.  Infrastructure
Transport  7.8  18.9  26.2
Energy  2.2  4.0  6.2
Communications  2.7  1.1  8.8
Urban Development  0.8  2.2  2.6
Sub-totol  12.6  28.2  88.7
III.  Social  Sectors
Health  6.4  16.6  21.0
Education  1.4  1.8  8.2
Housing  0.8  8.0  8.8
Sub-total  7.1  20.4  27.5
TOTAL  30.7  69.8  100.0
333=  3=
Source:  Ministry  of  Planning.
Issues
63.  Public  investment  progr6tns  have faced  a  number  of issues  during
implementation  in the  past. These  issues  can  be summarized  as:  (i)  the
lack  of sufficient  counterpart  funts;  (ii)  the  poor  selection  and  screening
of  projects;  (iii)  the  absence  of utilizing  economic  efficiency  criteria  in
the  selection  of public  projects;  and (iv)  the  poor  supervision  and
monitoring  of  projects.- 21 -
64.  Conclusions.  The size  of the  public  investment  program  needs  to
be reduced  to fit  financial  availabilities.  Since  some  projects  will  not
likely  be implemented  on schedule,  the  program  would  be underexecuted.
However,  the  Government  needs  to  define  a doable  program,  which  would  allow
recovery  of  public  investment.  To address  issues  regarding  the
preparation,  execution  and  monitoring  of  public  investment  program,  the
implementation  of the  following  actions  would  be usefult (i)  introducing
efficiency  and  other  savings  measures  to generate  sufficient  counterpart
funds  for  public  projects,  while  obtaining  additional  external  resources
(i.e.  from  Japan,  IDB,  and  USAID);  (ii)  improving  selection  and  screening
of  projects;  (iii)  introducing  the  use  of efficiency  criteria  to  evaluate
public  investment  projects;  and (iv)  improving  the  capacity  of the  Central
Government  in supervising  and  monitoring  projects.
65.  In terms  of sectoral  allocation  of the  public  investment  program
for  1988-90,  the  following  suggestions  could  be  mades
(i)  increase  distribution  and  transmission  of  electricity;
(ii) give  priority  to  projects  in the  social  sectors  (i.e.  provision
of  water  supply);
(iii) maintain  transport  infrastructure;
(iv) expand  investments  in  natural  resources;
(v) decelerate  the  pace  of  growth  of telecommunication  projects;
(vi) limit  expenditures  on railways  to  basic  minimum  maintenance;
and
(vii) limit  expenditures  on  ports  to basic  minimum  maintenance.
F.3.  The  Institutional  Framework  for  the
Preparation  of Public  Investment  Programs
66.  The  Ministry  of Planning  (SecPlan)  is in  charge  of  planning  public
investment  programs. In carrying  out  this  function,  SecPlan  does  not
utilize  economic  efficiency  criteria,  nor  does  it  use  cost-benefit
analysis. As a result,  the  project  screening  and  selection  process  has
been  very  weak in the  past.  SecPlan  has  prepared  another  such  plan for
1987-90. A review  of the  program  indicated  that  the  financing  needed  for
the  plan far  exceeds  the  level  of prudently  projected  public  savings  and
realistically  expected  capital  inflows  during  the  period. Furthermore,  the
project  selection  was  not  based  on economic  efficiency  criteria.
67.  Conclusions.  It is  suggested  that  planning  and screening  of
public  investment  projects  be strengthened.  To achieve  this  goal,
technical  assistance  needs  to  be provided  to  SecPlan  to  enable  it to  put
together  a financially  feasible  and  a growth-oriented  p-ablic  investment
program,  incorporating  only  thoroughly  reviewed  and  screened  projects,
selected  by using  efficiency  criteria. In this  way, a three-year  rolling
plan  could  be prepared. The  plan  should  be embedded  in a  macro-economic
framework,  which  needs  to  take  into  account  projections  of  at least  five
years  into  the  future. In the  short-term,  however,  it is suggested  that
the size  of the  program  be reduced  to  the  expected  financial
availabilities,  taking  into  account  the  Government's  priorities.- 22  -
G.  Public  Sector  Enterprises
68.  There  are  a large  number  of  public  enterprises  in  Honduras. These
include  companies,  such  as  utilities  (i.e.  electricity,  telecommunications,
and  water),  transport  (i.e.  railways,  ports),  public  banks (i.e.  both
agriculture  and  industry),  and  agricultural  marketing  agencies.
G.l. Introduction
69.  In  1987,  the  combined  revenues  of  public  sector  enterprises
accounted  for  about  402  total  public  sector  revenues  and  their  combined
expenditures,  372  of total  public  sector  expenditures.  Investment  outlays
of these  group  of enterprises  equalled  352  of total  public  sector
investment.
70.  The  overall  finances  of this  group  of entities  were in deficit
during  1984-87  (Table  14). Their  current  savings  averaged  about  2.32  of
GDP a  year  during  the  same  period  (Table  14). However,  the  deficit  on
their  overall  finances  would  have  been  much larger  in the  absence  of
transfers  from  the  Central  Government.
71.  Public  enterprises  face  a  number  of issues. These  includet
(i)  the  setting  of tariff  levels  on the  basis  of  political  considerations
rather  than  on efficiency  criteria,  and  not  adequately  taking  into  account
the  financial  needs  of entities;  (ii)  Congressional  approval  of changes  in
tariffs  and  user  charges,  which  make increases  in rates  very  difficult;
(iii)  overstaffing  in some  enterprises  (i.e.  HONDUTEL);  (iv)  inadequate
management  practices  such  as the  lack  of long-term  planning,  cumbersome
decision-making,  the  absence  of  assignments  of responsibilities  to
managers;  (v)  the  lack  of adequate  supervision  and  monitoring  of financing
of public  enterprises  by the  Central  Government;  (vi)  the  engaging  in
activities  outside  the  scope  originally  envisioned  for  some  of the  entities
(such  as COHDEFOR);  (vii)  inefficiency  in  operations;  (viii)  the  lack  of
standard  accounting  procedures  and  the  resulting  lack  of transparency  in
financial  information;  (ix)  inappropriate  decisions  on past  investments;
(x)  inadequate  efforts  to collect  revenues  (i.e.  ENEE,  HONDUTEL,  SANAA);
and (xii)  labor  problems.
72.  The  above-noted  issues  have  led  to a  multitude  of undesirable
results. These  include: (i)  weak finances  in  most institutions;
(ii)  proliferation  of a large  number  of  enterprises  without  a clear
mandate;  (iii)  price  distortions;  (iv)  high  capital-output  ratios  in
investments;  (v)  inadequate  statistical  information,  produced  with  a delay
which  makes  it  difficult  to take  policy  decisions  based  on recent
information;  and (vi)  dependence  on Central  Government  transfers  and
external  finance  to fund  their  operations.- 23 -
Table  14:  Finances  of  Public  Sector  Enterprises,  1981-87
(Z  of GDP)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 1987
Current  Savings  2.1  1.9  2.3  2.3  2.9  2.1  2.0
Overall  Balance  (-=deficit)  -4.8  -5.4  -6.5  -6.5  -2.7  -1.8 -2.3
Net  External  Financing  2.9  2.0  2.9  5.0  3.1  0.7  0.3
Source: Central  Bank  of  Honduras.
73.  The  financial  assessment  of the  performance  of public  sector
enterprises  is  hampered  by extensive  non-market  interventions  such  as price
controls  on outputs,  as  well  as conversion  of their  debt into  equity,
implicit  and  explicit  transfers  received  from  the  Central  Government,
assumption  of external  debt  obligations  of some  enterprises  by the  Central
Government  and  other  implicit  subsidies  they  receive  from  the  rest  of the
public  sector  (i.e.  non-repayment  of telephone  bills  etc.). Interest
subsidies  and  tax  privileges  also  make  it difficult  to assess  the  actual
financial  performance  of these  enterprises.
Suggested  Action  Program
74.  To address  issues  regarding  public  sector  enterprises,  a  medium-
term  action  program  needs  to  be  prepared  and  implemented.  Such  a program
should  include  the  following  actions:
(i)  increasing  tariffs  and  user  charges;
(ii) reducing  expenditures;
(iii) introducing  efficiency  measures;
(iv) improving  services;
(v)  restructuring  ENEE's  external  debt;  and
(vi) privatizing  and  closing  some  enterprises.
75.  Specific  examples  of  an action  program  are  illustrated  below:
A)  Reduction  in  expenditures:
a)  Decrease  in employment  levels  (HONDUTEL);
b)  Introduction  of efficiency  measures  with  pre-established
targets  to increase  efficiency  (SANAA,  ENEE,  HONDUTEL);
and
c)  Deferring  low  priority  investments  (HONDUTEL).24 -
B)  Increase  in  Revenues:
- Adjustments  in  utility  rates  and  user  charges  (SANMA,
ENEE);
C)  Improvement  in services  (LNEE,  SANAA);
D)  Refinancing  of  existing  debt (ENEE);  and
E)  Further  privatization  and  closure  of  public  enterprises
(CONADI,  BANADESA,  IHMA,  BANASUPRO's  distribution  network,  FNH,
and  COHBANA).
76.  The  introduction  of the  above-noted  measures  will likely  reduce
the  reliance  of  public  sector  enterprises  on the  Central  Government  budget
over  the  years. Hence,  transfers  to public  sector  enterprises  such  as  INA
and  COHDEFOR  could  then  be scaled  down  considerably,  while  the  Government
could begin  to receive  tax  payments  from  HONDUTEL  and  the  National  Port
Authority  (ENP).
G.2.  Institutional  Links  amona  the  Central
Government  and  Public  Sector  Enterprises
77.  At present,  the  institutional  links  among  the  Central  Government
and  public  sector  enterprises  are  quite  weak.  The legal  framework  for  this
link  was first  established  in  1984  with the  introduction  cf the  law  for
financial  adjustment  of the  public  sector. This  law  led  to the
establishment  of the  Superintendency  of Decentralized  Institutions.  The
latter  entity  is responsible  for  monitoring  the  implementation  of budgets
of those  institutions.
78.  After  its  establishment,  the  Superintendency  has  begun  to  collect
statistical  information  on the  finances  of public  sector  enterprises  and  to
publish  reports  which  indicate  actual  versus  planned  expenditures.  As a
result,  the  entity has  only  carried  out  clerical  functions. It did  not
develop  into  a  mature  policy-oriented  entity  with a good  overall  view  of
finances  of public  sector  enterprises;  neither  did  it  develop  a good  and
usable  statistical  data  base  to  judge  the  performance  of  public  sector
enterprises.  Furthermore,  it failed  to obtain  information  on extra-
budgetary  outlays  of enterprises  and  did  not  closely  follow  actual  budget
implementation.  As a result,  the  supervision  and  monitoring  of  public
sector  enterprises  by the  Central  Government  has remained  very  weak.
79.  Conclusions. There  is  an  urgent  need to strengthen  the
Superintendency  both in  terms  of staff  as  well as its  monitoring  powers.
Without  such  a strengthened  entity  within  the  Ministry  of Finance,  it  would
be an extremely  difficult  task  to implement  a tough  fiscal  package.
However,  improved  monitoring  of  public  sector  enterprises  should  not
conflict  with the  responsible  and  accountable  management  practices  at  the
public  enterprise  level. It should  lead  to an improved  two-way
communication  among  the  Central  Government  and  public  sector  enterprises.- 25 -
G.3.  Privatization
80.  To reduce  the  financial  burden  on the  Central  Government  to  own  and
to operate  a  multitude  of  public  sector  enterprises,  there  is  a  need for
privatizing  some  entities  and  some  servJces  currently  provided  by those
entities  as  well  as to close  down  others. This  would  allow  an increase
both in  allocative  as  well as in  productive  efficiency. It  would  also  help
the  public  sector  to focus  on  high  priority  areas.
81.  The  Government  has  taken  steps  to  privatize  some  public  sector
enterprises.  The  authorities  have  already  sold  some  of the  companies  in
CONADI's  (public  development  bank)  and  COHDEFOR's  portfolios  and  they
intend  to  continue  this  process.  Given  the  complexities  involved  in  such
operations,  the  process  will likely  be lengthy.
82.  Issues  faced  in  accelerat.ng  the  privatization  effort  includet
(i) a cumbersome  legal  framework,  which  defines  the  rules  under
which  privatization  is  to take  place;
(Li) the  absence  of a truly  committed  political  leader  who  can
devote  full  time  to the  privatization  effort;  and
(iii) the  absence  of a  well-established  capital  market  in  which
assets  of  public  sector  enterprises  are sold  and  transferred
to the  private  sector.
The  first  issue  identified  above  results  in  a lengthy  process. The  third
is3ue  results  in the  need  to establish  sale  prices  of  enterprises--a
difficult  feat,  given  the  conflicting  objectives  of trying  to determine  as
high  a price  as possible  to benefit  from  the  sale  (i.e.  in  terms  of higher
levels  of revenues  and  political  saleability)  and  of attempting  to  define
as low  a price  as possible  to ensure  a sale.
83.  Conclusions.  To expedite  the  privatization  effort,  it  is
suggested  that  the  Government  designate  a  high level  official  who  would  be
responsible  for  overseeing  the  whole  operation,  providing  direction  and
guidance  and  top-level  Government  support. The  current  arrangement,  with
one  high level  official  involved  in  privatization  as  well as in  a  multitude
of other  tasks,  is inadequate.  Regarding  the  cumbersome  law  which  defines
the  privatization  process,  the  suggestion  is  not  to change  it in  the  short-
term,  given  the  uncertainties  involved  in  attempting  to  modify  it  under  the
present  political  atmosphere.  Concerning  the  dutermination  of  a price  at
which  enterprises  will  be sold  to the  private  sector,  it is important  to
note  that  the  fiscal  impact  of the  proposed  privatization  will  not  be
significant  in the  short-term.  However,  a decrease  in  the  size  of the
public  sector  would  allow  the  Central  Government  to focus  its  attention  on
the  issues  it  has to  address  and  do a  better  job  within  the  context  of  a
reduced  public  sector. On the  other  hand,  selling  enterprises  at a  very
low  price  (i.e.  compared  to their  book  values  or  current  market  values)
would  go against  public  sentiment  and  would  likely  make further  efforts  at
privatization  politically  more  difficult. Regarding  the  particular
enterprises  to  be privatized  or closed,  it  is suggested  that  the  Government
continue  with the  privatization  effort  for  enterprises  owned  and  operated
by CONADI  and  COHDEFOR  along  the  lines  of its  declared  strategy. However,- 26 -
it is important  to include  in  the  privatization  program  the  following
enterprises:  BANADESA  (National  Agricultural  Development  Bank),  IHMA
(Agriculture  Marketing  Agency),  and  BANASUPRO's  (Food  Marketing  Agency)
distribution  network. It is  also  suggested  to close  those  enterprises  for
which  the  reason  for  their  existence  has  disappeared  (i.e.  COHBANA--Banana
Corporation)  or a  continued  operation  would  imply  high levels  of  Central
Government  transfers  (i.e.  CONADI). If  priced  to  market,  both  domestic  and
foreign  private  sector  would  be interested  in  buying  and  operating  the
above-mentioned  publicly  owned  enterprises.
G.4,  National  Electricity  ComDany  (ENEE)
84.  ENEE  faces  a  major  financial  problem  in its  overall  finances,
which  are  expected  to  worsen  in  the  medium-term  in the  absence  of
corrcective  measures. The  root  cause  of this  financial  crisis  is the  high
instaUed electric  power  generation  capacity,  which  is  currently  not  being
fully  utilized  and  the  mounting  external  debt  service  payments,  which  are
expected  to increase  substantially  in the  next  several  years. The  lprge
increase  in  ENEE's  installed  capacity  is  associated  with the  lumpy
investment  project,  El Cajon.
85.  As described  in  other  parts  of the  report,  expenditures  on  El
Cajon  accounted  for  half  of the  public  investment  expenditures  during
1981-85. Large  external  disbursements,  including  from  IBRD  and  IDB,
financed  a significant  part  of the  expenditures.  The  project  was found  to
be the  least  cost  alternative  at the  time  of evaluation  of different
alternatives--including  by the  World  Bank--  and  its  economic  viability
depended  on expectations  of  buoyant  domestic  and  regional  markets.
However,  as both  of these  markets  grew  slower  than  predicted  and  some  CACH
members  began  to experience  financial  difficulties,  ENEE's  revenues  did  not
materialize  as expected. On the  other  hand,  cost  overruns  on  El Cajon
project  occurred  and  debt  service  obligations  started  to pressure  ENEE's
finances. The  company's  operations  resulted  in increased  deficits  of an
annual  average  of  t230  million  during  1982-86. With  hindsight,  it  is  not
clear  whether  or to  what  extent  the  company's  finances  would  have  been
helped  by higher  levels  of domestic  and  regional  demand  than  those
experienced  so far. It is  possible  that  even  with a  higher  level  of
economic  activity  than  experienced  so far,  ENEE's  revenues  would  still  have
failed  to  meet  contractual  debt  service  payments  in the  next  several  years.
86.  Based  on ENEE's  own  financial  projections  and  the  present
structure  of its  external  debt,  the  company  will  not  be able  to service  its
contractual  debt service  obligations  at least  until  mid-1990s. Without
refinancing  of  external  debt  obligations,  ENEE  will  be insolvent,  thus
adversely  affecting  the  country's  debt  repayment  capacity.
87.  Regarding  its  tariff  levels,  ENEE  did  not  modify  them  for  several
years,  allowing  it  to decline  in real  terms. Based  on long-run  marginal
costs  and  at the  official  exchange  rate,  however,  the  present  level  of
electricity  tariffs  does  not seem  to  be too  much  out  of line.
88.  Conclusions. In  view  of the  magnitude  of the  financial
disequilibrium  faced  by ENEE,  however,  electricity  tariffs  need  to be
raised  to  cover  part  of the  financial  needs  of the  company. Additionally,
the  company  must  intensify  its  revenue  collection  efforts. If the  needed- 27 -
adjustments  are  not introduced  by the  company  and  the  required  refinancing
is  not  provided,  then  the  Central  Government  has to introduce  a stronger
adjustment  package,  including  additional  revenue  increases  and  expenditure
reductions.  As explained  in the  section  on Central  Government  finances,
the  scope  for  a strong  fiscal  adjustment  is  probably  not likely  in the  next
several  years,  pointing  out  the  need  to introduce  measures  at the  company
level. Exports  of electricity  to  neighboring  countries  on a cash  payment
basis  would  obviously  ease  the  financial  situation  only  if  the  regional
outlook  improves.
89.  Concerning  expenditures,  there  is scope  for  reducing  current
expenditures  through  the  introduction  of efficiency  measures  on a limited
scale. Regarding  investment  expenditures,  however,  a  well-thought-out
program,  has  to be  prepared  to  enable  ENEE  to  expand  the  distribution  of
electricity  in  the  country. The  entity  is also  suffering  from  the
inadequate  planning  of transmission  of the  electricity  network,  which
should  in fact  have  been  designed  and  put  into  implementation  along  with
the  El Cajon  project.
G.5. National  ARricultural  Development  Bank (BANADESA)
90.  BANADESA  is a  Government-owned  Bank  with a  branch  network  of 33
agencies. At end-1986,  the  book  value  of BANADESA's  assets  was t574
million  (US$287  million)  and  outstanding  loans  equalled  t300  million
(US$150  million),  of  which  over  75Z  were credits  to the  rural  sector. The
entity  channeled  credit  to cooperatives  of the  reformed  sector  in
agriculture. It also  lends  to small  farmers,  mostly  producing  basic
grains. Loans  for  the  livestock  sector  rose  from  34.5Z  in  1980  to 45.82  in
1986.
91.  Political  interventions  and  directed  lending  in the  past  resulted
in a large  share  of BANADESA's  portfolio  falling  into  arrears. These
financial  difficulties  of the  entity  does  not  peramit  increased  lending  for
agriculture  in the  next few  years. In fact,  BANADESA  is  requesting  an
injection  of  capital  from  the  Central  Government.  However,  unless  the
present  policies  of BANADESA  are  modified--an  unlikely  event  in the  short-
term--the  entity  will likely  require  continued  injection  of capital  in  the
future. Given  the  need to increase  public  savings,  further  capital
injections  will likely  postpone  the  day  of reckoning.  BANADESA  has tried
many times,  in the  past,  to introduce  corrective  measures  to recover  its
portfolio  in arrears,  with  no concrete  result  to date.
92.  Conclusions. If  politically  viable,  BANADESA  needs  to  be closed
down.  Continued  operation  of  the  entity  will  not  be  profitable.  Closing
it  will likely  prove  to  be difficult,  given  the  political  sensitivities
involved. To facilitate  the  process  of  closure,  assuming  that  the
authorities  choose  to do so,  they  should  address  the  issue  of channelling
credit  to the  agriculture  sector. One  option  would  be to open  a  window  at
the  Central  Bank  to  provide  agricultural  credit.
G.6.  National  Industrial  Development  Corporation  (CONADI)
93.  CONADI  is  a  public  development  Bank  established  to encourage  the
development  of the  industrial  sector  in  Honduras. It  has  investments  in- 28 -
about  60 firms. These  ventures  account  for  about  half of the  private
investment  in  Honduras. These  firms  are in sectors  as diverse  as in food,
cement,  sugar,  chemicals,  and  wood.  About  one-third  of these  enterprises
are  not in  operation. Four  companies  did  not start  operations  and 17
closed  down after  being  in operation  for  some  time.  Those  that  still
operate  have a reported  capacity  utilization  rate  of only 302-40Z.
Virtually  all  of these  enterprises  have faced  and  are still  confronting
financial  difficulties. As a result,  CONADI's  liabilities  are  now  well
over its  assets.  The  Government  has started  a serious  investment  program
by which it intends  to sell  or  close  down  all  companies  owned  by  CONADI.
It  has also  assumed  the repayment  of the  entity's  large  debt service  to
external  creditors  since  1980.  In the future,  the  company  intends  to
continue  to sell  companies  in  its  portfolio. On the  negative  side,  the
Government  prepared  a new draft  law,  which  would  maintain  CONADI's  previous
development  banking  role. The above-mentioned  draft  law,  if enacted,  would
likely  be a repetition  of the  old  mistakes. Given  the  country's  precarious
financial  situation,  there  is  no  more scope  for  repeating  the same  mistake.
94.  Conclusions. It is suggested  that  the  Government  continue  with
the  proposed  privatization  of  CONADI's  companies. It is  also suggested
that  it  give serious  consideration  to  not  proceeding  with the above-noted
draft  law,  which  would  maintain  CONADI's  development  banking  role,  and
close  CONADI.
G.7.  Honduran  Telecommunications  Comoany (HONDUTEL)
95.  HONDUTEL  owns,  operates,  and invests  in  telecommunications  in
Honduras.  Its  operations  have  produced  small  surpluses  in the recent  past.
However,  the company  is  burdened  by overstaff±ng,  administrative  problems,
inefficient  operations  and  the lack  of adequate  enforcement  of revenue
collection.
96.  Conclusions. It is suggested  that  a  number  of  measures  be
introduced  to increase  HONDUTEL's  overall  financial  surplus  to enable  the
company  to transfer  resources  to  the  Central  Government. In  view of the
already  high  domestic  telecommunication  charges,  especially  to overseas,
increasing  them is  not suggested. Hence,  the  adjustment  effort  has to
focus  on:  (i)  reducing  excess  employment;  (ii)  raisin,g  efficiency  in
operations;  (iii)  enforcing  collection;  and (iv)  decelerating  the  execution
of  projects  to the  extent  possible,  given  that  a lower  priority  has to  be
attached  to further  development  of the  telecommunications  sector  compared
to other  sectors,  given  the severe  financial  difficulties  the  country  faces
at this  point  in time.
G.8.  National  Water  and  Seweraae  Service  Company  (SANAM)
97.  SANAA  is responsible  for  providing  water in  Honduras. It faces  a
huge  task in  expanding  the  network  for  water  provision,  since  about  half of
the population  is  without  safe  water.  About  80S of  households  in
Tegucigalpa  receive  water  and  about  601  of  households  in  urban  and semi-
urban  areas  are  connected  to piped-water. However,  SANAA  does  not  provide
drinking  water to  areas  where  the population  does  not exceed  500.
98.  SANAA  has relied,  in  the past,  on external  financing  and  large
Central  Government  transfers  to finance  its  investment  program. Its  user
charges  have  covered  only  part  of the  operating  costs,  with debt service
payments  being  assumed  in  most cases  by the  Central  Government. The
company  also faces  problems  because  of its lax  collection  policies. To- 29 -
expand  the  provision  of  water  both  to  the  metropolitan  Tegucigalpa  area  and
to the  rural  sector,  SANAM  intends  to start  3  new  projects,  costing  about
US$120  million  and  complete  them  by 1990. These  projects  will  be financed
by the  Inter-American  Development  Bank (IDB)  as  well  as by transfers  from
the  Central  Government,  which  will also  assume  the  repayment  of  debt
service. SANM has expressed  its  intention  to  increase  its  tariffs  with
the  objective  of covering  152  of the  expected  capital  expenditures  in  the
next several  years.
99.  Conclusions. Because  of the  planned  ambitious  investment  program,
SANAA  can  not  be expected  to implement  any  more projects  until  1990.
Moreover,  given  its  precarious  finances,  it  will also  need  to continue  to
rely  on Central  Government  transfers  to fund  its  investments.  However,
user  charges  will  need  to be increased,  perhaps  more than  planned,  to
finance  a larger  share  of the  ertity's  planned  investment  expenditures  as
well  as to tighten  collection  procedures  to reduce  dependence  on Central
Government  transfers,  given  the  need  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit.
G.9.  National  Port  Authority  (ENP)
100.  There  are  five  ports  in the  country. Those  include  four  ports  on
the  Atlantic  Coast: Puerto  Cortez,  Tela,  La  Ceiba,  and  Castilla. On the
Pacific  side,  there  is a  deepwater  anchorage  at  Amapala  on  El Tigre  island
and  a  mainland  port  at San  Lorenzo. ENP  operates  all  ports  in the  country.
After  some  deterioration,  ENP's  operations  began  to  produce  a small  surplus
in the  last  few  years. Being  relatively  more efficient  and  handling  the
bulk  of the  port services  in the  country,  Puerto  Cortez's  operations
resulted  in large  financial  surpluses,  covering  the  combined  deficits  of
the  other  ports. Owing  to reduced  economic  activity,  all  ports  presently
have  excess  capacity.
101.  The  level  and  structure  of  port  user  charges  present  difficulties
in  judging  their  adequacy. First,  tariffs  are  subject  to a  very  complex
set  of regulations,  rendering  them  difficult  to  compare  with rates  with
those  of other  ports  in the  region. Second,  a study  conducted  a couple  of
years  ago  concluded  that  the  incidence  of port  charges  was  not significant
in  total  costs  of various  product  categories.  Third,  a comparison  of
relative  port  charges  should  take  into  account  relative  efficiencies  of
ports  concerned. It is  believed  that  Puerto  Cortez  is  much  more  efficient
in  handling  cargo  than  most  other  ports  in  Central  America. As a result,
prima  facie,  it is  not possible  to conclude  that  port  charges  are  high in
Honduras  or that  they  reduce  profitability  in  exporting.
102.  Conclusions. It is suggested  that  a thorough  analysis  of  port
user  charges  and  costs  be undertaken  to simplify  the  rate  structure  and  to
introduce  the  needed  changes,  taking  into  account  both  the  financial  needs
of the  Port  Authority  and  the  need  to  avoid  unnecessarily  increasing
charges  for  trade  activities.  Assuming  that  the  trade  levels  would
increase  as a result  of recovery  of  economic  activity  under  the
implementation  of adjustment  measures,  port  revenues  would  also  likely
expand. If current  expenditures  are  not  allowed  to increase  significantly,
ENP's  overall  surplus  will  also  likely  rise. In  view  of the  adequacy  of
port  facilities  for  the  next several  years,  no  major  investment  will  be
needed  to  expand  the  port facilities  in  the  country. It is,  therefore,- 30 -
suggested  that  ENP  transfer  part  of its  projected  financial  surpluses  to
the  Central  Government.  In fact,  since  ENP is  not  exempt  from  taxes  by
law,  no legal  changes  would  be  necessary  to achieve  this  objective.
G.10. National  Railway  of Honduras  (FNH)
103.  The  railway  system  operated  by FNH  consists  of three  narrow  gauge
railways  in the  north,  with 992  km. serving  primarily  the  banana
plantations  in the  Sula  Valley  and  the  northern  coastal  strip. It  also
transports  sawn  timber  and  agricultural  imports  and  exports. In the  recent
past,  the  entity  incurred  small  financial  losses,  financed  by Central
Government  transfers.  Although  the  lines  serving  primarily  the  banana
plantations  should,  in  principle,  be  more  economic  vis-a-vis  the  highway
network,  it is  not  clear  whether  the  continued  operation  of the  system  as  a
whole  or those  lines  which  are  not  serving  the  captive  banana  trade  are
still  economic. The  company  also  suffers  from  labor  problems,
inefficiencies  in  operations  which  translate  into  high  o-perating  costs  as
well as reduced  volume  of operations,  reflecting  both  the  problems  faced  by
the  real  economy  as  well as shifting  of some  cons;umers  into  highway
traffic.
104.  FNH  also  has  a  very  weak  management. Despite  the  reduced  volume
and  bleak  pro  pects  for  recovery  of transport  volume  in  the  short-term,  the
company's  mantgement  has  been  considering  a very  ambitious  investment
program,  including  setting  up a  new line  which  would  connect  the  Atlantic
and  Pacific  Coasts  as an  alternative  transport  mode to the  Panama  Canal.
105.  Conclusions. To improve  the  financial  performance  of the  entity,
it is  suggested  that  efficiency-improving  and  cost-cutting  measures  be
introduced.  There  is  also  a need  to strengthen  the  management  practices  to
improve  services. A short  and  quick  study  might  be useful  to  determine  the
economic  viability  of the  railway  system  to prepare  recommend'itions  on the
fate  of the  company. It is  possible  that  a gradual  phase-out  could  be
planned  based  on such  a study. Perhaps,  only  those  lines  which  are
economically  feasible  and  serving  the  captive  banana  plantations  could
still  be  maintained.  With respect  to the  investment  program,  it is
essential  to keep  future  investments  in railways  to  basic  minimum
maintenance.
G.ll.  Honduran  Agricultural  Marketing  Institute  (IHMA)
106.  IHMA  was established  by the  Government  to stabilize  basic  grains
prices  and  ensure  self-sufficiency  in  food. Despite  these  intentions  and
setting  high  producer  prices,  IHMA  has  not  been  able  to  achieve  both  of its
objectives.  Prices  have fluctuated  and  Honduras  still  imports  part  of its
food  supply. The  pursuance  of the  above-noted  objectives,  however,
resulted  in financial  losses,  subsidized  by the  Central  Government.  It
also  increased  relative  profitability  of  basic  grains,  in  which  the  country
does  not seem  to  have a  comparative  advantage  vis-a-vis  export  crops,  in
which  the  country  ueems  to  enjoy  a  comparative  advantage. These  policies
also  entailed  implementation  of import  controls  and  hence  in  the
disassociation  of domestic  food  prices  from  international  ones.  In fact,
in the  recent  past,  producer  prices  set  by IHMA  have remained  above  both
international  prices  and  domestic  selling  prices. They  have  also  exceeded
other  domestic  producer  prices. Another  issue  concerns  the  discriminating
way by  which  IHMA  selects  farmers  from  whom it  purchases  grains. Since,- 31 -
IHMA's  purchases  cover  only  one-tenth  of domestic  production  in  each  crop,
it selects  the  farmers  from  whom to  buy  based  on  very  discriminating
criteria,  resulting  in an income  transfer  from  the  public  coffers  to  a
selected  few  who have  arbitrary  access  to IHMA. Having  a small  share  in
the  market,  IHMA's  impact  on setting  producer  prices  has  also  remained
relatively  weak.
107.  Conclusions.  To reduce  the  financial  drain  on the  Central
Government  of food  subsidies,  and  begin  to send  appropriate  signals  in the
direction  of improved  export  profitability  rather  than  encouraging  basic
grains,  this  report  suggests  that  IHMA's  operations  either  be phased  out  or
the  company  be privatized.  Obviously,  given  the  political  sensitivities
and  strong  vested  interests  involved,  this  action  could  not  be taken
immediately.  However,  if closure  or  privatization  options  are  not
politically  feasible  in  the  short-term,  this  report  suggests  that  the
company's  operations  be gradually  phased  out.  To cushion  the  impact  on the
poor  farmers--to  the  extent  poor farmers  are  affected  by these  changes--the
Government  may  wish to  consider  targeting  food  subsidies  to  the  needy
farmers. It is  also  suggested  that  the  Government  phase  out  its  role  in
setting  basic  grains  prices  and  permit  importation  of food  at tariff  rates
within  the  context  of its  overall  tariff  rate  structure.
G.12. National  Food  Marketing  Agency  (BANASUPRO)
108.  BANASUPRO  is  charged  with regulating  consumer  prices  for  basic
goods,  mostly  food  items,  as  well as  making  those  goods  available  to the
public  through  its  outlets  in the  country. It generally  buys  basic  grains
from  IHMA. Following  the  financial  deterioration  of its
outlets,  the  company  decided  to  privatize  some  of them,  which  have  now  been
transformed  into  profitable  ventures.
109.  Conclusions. It is suggested  that  all  BANASUPRO's  outlets  be
privatized  over  a  number  of years  within  a  well-defined  medium-term
program. Furthermore,  the  authorities  are  well  advised  to seriously
consider  phasing  out  setting  consumer  prices.
G.13. Honduran  Forestry  Development  Corporation  (COHDEFOR)  and
Honduran  Banana  Corporation  (COHBANA)
110.  COHDEFOR  was set  up to  ensure  the  management  and regulation  of
forests  in the  country. It,  however,  engaged  in  commercialization  of  wood
products  and  diluted  its  focus  on forest  management. It  owned  and  operated
a number  of enterprises,  which  faced  losses  and  liquidity  problems. To
reverse  the  financial  deterioration,  the  authorities  started  a process  of
privatization  and  sold  some  of the  enterprises  owned  by the  company.
111.  COHBANA  was established  by the  Government  to rehabilitate  banana
plantations  following  the  damage  caused  by the  Fifi  hurricane. After
successfully  carrying  out  this  important  task,  however,  the  entity  lost  its
reason  for  its  existence  as the  production  of bananas  is  being  handled  by
large  multinational  corporations.- 32 -
112.  Conclusions. It is suggested  that  the  authorities  continue  the
privatization  of COHDEFOR's  portfolio  of investments.  It is  also  suggested
that  COHDEFOR  focus  its  attention  on forest  management  and  not  be allowed
to reenter  the  commercialization  of  wood  products  in  the  future.
G.14.  Honduran  Coffee  Institute  (IHCAFE)
113.  IHCAFE  is in  charge  of  providing  technical  assistance,  credit  and
infrastructure  to  coffee  farmers. It  undertakes  investments  in road
construction  in  coffee  growing  areas. In  addition,  IHCAFE  introduced
programs  to  control  the  coffee  rust  disease,  improve  coffee  yields  and
encourage  crop  diversification.  Its  revenues  are  derived  from  a share  from
the sale  of coffee. In 1988,  Congress  reduced  the  share  to be allocated  to
IHCAFE  from  the  sale  of coffee  because  of  producer  pressures.
114.  Major  issues  regarding  IHCAFE  include  a smaller  share  of its
personnel  engaged  in  direct  extension  services  compared  to  a larger  group
at the  headquarters,  continued  changes  in the  rules  of the  game  for  the
commercialization  of  coffee,  which  the  entity  defines  each  year,  leading  to
increased  uncertainty  for  the  private  sector. The results  have  been
reflected  in  a lack  of success  in combating  the  coffee  rust  disease,
despite  the  high  overhead  costs,  which  have  become  difficult  to finance  in
a sound  manner.
115.  Conclusions. It is imperative  that  the  entity  restructure  its
operations,  devote  a large  share  of its  personnel  to  extension  to  help  the
coffee  growers  effectively  prevent  the  coffee  rust  disease. The  entity
should  not change  the  rules  of the  game  for  commercialization  of  coffee
each  year to  be able  to  gain  the  confidence  of farmers. It should  not
undertake  road  investments,  as this  activity  should  be carried  out  by the
Ministry  of Public  Works.  IHCAFE  should  begin  to operate  more efficiently
with reduced  financial  resources.
G.15.  National  ARrarian  Institute  (INA)
116.  INA  was established  to  be the  principal  instrument  in promoting
rural  land  redistribution.  However,  the  entity  did  not  develop  into  a
strong  institution.  Few  professionals  on its  large  staff,  duplications  in
functions  among  various  units  and  administrative  problems  hindered  INA  in
achieving  its  original  purpose  successfully.  In the  past,  it relied  on
external  financial  assistance  and large  Central  Government  transfers  for
financial  survival. In fact,  it  has  become  one  of the  principal  users  of
Central  Government  transfers  in the  last  couple  of  years.
117.  Conclusions.  It is suggested  that  INA's  scale  of operations  be
substantially  reduced,  its  employment  decreased  and  the  efficiency  of its
management  be enhanced  to levels  consistent  with tight  public  finances  and
increased  delivery  of its  services  to farmers.- 33 -
G.16.  Central  Bank
118.  Central  Bank  finances  need to  be reviewed  thoroughly  to  determine
whether  it  has incurred  quasi-fiscal  losses. It  does  not  seem  likely  that
the  Central  Bank  operations  have  produced  losses. Given  the  quality  of the
Central  Bank's  assets,  however,  it is likely  that  part  of its  portfolio  may
have doubtful  economic  value. For  example,  most loans  to BANADESA  and
CORFINA  may  not  be recoverable.  Furthermore,  adequate  provisions  for  these
likely  losses  have  not  been  made. However,  the  Central  Bank  has  not  yet
realized  an explicit  loss  on its  claims  to  these  institutions.
119.  Conclusion. There  is  a  need to review  Central  Bank  accounts  to
see  what impact,  if  any,  the  above-mentioned  assets  would  have  on the
quality  of its  assets  as  well as  make adequate  provisions,  if  required,
based  on such  a review.
H.  Overall  Conclusions
120.  Although,  in  theory,  there  is an innumerable  number  of options
available  to the  authorities  to  address  their  fiscal  issues,  the  final
package  would  likely  include  a  combination  of reductions  in  expenditures
and increases  in revenues. In the  final  analysis,  the  political
feasibility  of actions  (i.e.  expenditure  reductions  and  tax  increases)
would  determine  the  final  package. The  preferred  package  is  obviously  one
which  would involve  more  expenditure  reductions  than  revenue  increases.
But the  final  package  could  include  more revenue  increases  than  expenditure
reductions,  if reducing  expenditures  does  not  prove  to  be politically
viable. In the  short  term,  the  Central  Government  will  need to  undertake
the  largest  share  in adjustment.  In  the  medium-term,  however,  with the
introduction  of  modernization  measures  and  the  rationalization  of public
investment  program,  more actions  should  be urndertaken  by public  sector
enterprises.
H.1.  The  Main  Thrust  of a  Proposed  Action  Program
121.  The  World  Bank  could  help  the  Honduran  Government  in  implementing
its  policy  reforms  in  the  public  sector  through  a  public  sector  management
operation. The  main thrust  of the  reforms  should  include  the  following:
(i) modernizing  the  administration  of the  public  sector;
(ii) increasing  public  sector  savings  from  0.42  of  GDP  in 1987  to
about 4% - 52 of GDP by 1991;
(iii) ensuring  the  financial  viability  of  ENEE;  and
(iv) implementing  a  growth-oriented,  financially  viable  pubic
investment  program.
122.  The  objectives  of  a plan  to improve  public  sector  management
should  include: increasing  efficiency  of resource  use,  rationalizing
public  sector  operations,  and  reducing  financial  disequilibrium.  Toward
these  ends,  the  authorities  should  focus  on preparing  and  implementing  an
action  plan  to:
(i)  increase  savings;
(ii) introduce  efficiency-increasing  measures;
(iii) improve  service  delivery;
(iv) improve  the  budgeting  process;- 34 -
(v)  implement  a  well-defined  privatization  program,  including
closures  and  transferring  the  provision  of some  public
services  to the  private  sector;
(vi) establish  financial  targets  for  public  sector  enterprises
and  reduce  Central  Government  transfers  to  public  sector
enterprises;
(vii) improve  the  administration  of tax  collection;
(viii) prepare  and  implement  a  growth-oriented  and  financially
feasible  public  investment  program;
(ix) improve  debt  management;
(x)  improve  decision-making  at the  public  enterprise  level,
giving  managerial  autonomy  and  accountability  to  managements
of those  enterprises;
(xi) standardize  accounting  practices  and  properly  account  for
debt  service  obligations;
(xii) start  external  management  audits  of enterprises;
(xiii) improve  coordination  in the  sector;
(xiv) target  subsidies;  and
(xv) produce  timely  and  analytically-oriented  financial
information  on the  public  sector.
H.2.  Proposed  Package  of  Measures  to  Reduce  the  Fiscal  Deficit
123.  Apart  from  the  need  to introduce  measures  to  modernize  the  public
sector  finances  in  Honduras,  there  is  also  the  urgent  need to reduce  the
fiscal  deficit. Implementation  of actions  listed  below  would  reduce  the
fiscal  deficit  in  the  short-term:  (i)  an increase  in the  sales  tax  rate;
(ii)  introduction  of a selective  consumption  tax; (iii)  reinstating
taxation  on coffee  exports;  (iv)  reduction  of  exemptions  under  imports;
(v)  increasing  tariffs  and  user  charges;  (vi)  decreasing  current
expenditures  (i.e.  reducing  or slowing  down  expenditures  on goods  and
services  as  well as on  wages  and  salaries  through  the  implementation  of  a
freeze  and  a reduction  in  public  employment--mostly  through  attrition);  and
(vii)  deferring  some  low  priority  investments.
H.3.  Risks  Of The  Suggested  Package  of  Measures
124.  The  program  is  not  riskless. Both  external  and  domestic  factors
could  adversely  affect  the  program. On the  external  side,  unforeseen
developments  on the  Nicaragua  border,  deterioration  in the  terms  of trade
(i.e.  a decline  in the  international  price  of coffee  and  bananas  and  an
increase  in  the  oil  price)  could  adversely  affect  the  macro  outlook,  and
hence  fiscal  outcomes. Domestically,  a  number  of issues  could  pose  a
threat  to the  program. First,  political  consensus--needed  to implement  the
program--may  not  develop  as expected. Second,  a critical  number  of
measures  (i.e.  changes  in the  tax  rates,  adjustments  in  utility  prices)
will depend  on Congressional  approval,  which  may  not  materialize. Third,
unions  in  Honduras  are  powerful  and  they  will likely  resist  reductions  in
employment  and  a continued  freeze  or a  decrease  in salaries. The  teacher
unions  are  especially  powerful  and  they  would  likely  protest  a freeze  on
their  salaries. Fourth,  obvious  short-term  costs  resulting  from  the
implementation  of the  stabilization  program  (i.e.  increased  unemployment,
possible  reductions  in real  per  capita  consumption  levels)  could  make it
difficult  for  the  authorities  to fully  implement  the  program. Fifth,  the- 35 -
timing  of the  implementation  of specific  measures  would likely  be as
important  as the  package  of  measures. Finally,  fiscal  adjustment  could
depress  GDP  growth  and  could  force  the  authorities  to  abandon  the  program.
Therefore,  the  program  needs  to  be kept  flexible  and  public  investment
expenditures--financed  by increased  savings  and  external  financing  which
would  be obtained  from  official  agencies,  mostly  at concessional  terms--
increased  to counteract  the  possible  recessionary  impact  of the  fiscal
adjustment  measures.
H.4.  Conclusion
125.  Modernization  efforts  should  not  necessarily  lead  to increased
savings  immediately,  but they  will surely  have  a positive  payoff  in the
medium  to long-term  in encouraging  savings. Any serious  effort  at
strengthening  public  finances  should  include  efforts  to restructure  ENEE's
external  debt  obligations. If  the  suggestions  of this  report  are
translated  into  timely  action,  they  would  help  reduce  the  public  sector
deficit  and  hence  would  have a favorable  impact  on the  balance  of  payments
and increase  savings. The  rationalization  measures  would  also  help  the
public  sector  focus  its  attention  on the  most  critical  areas  and  improve
service  delivery  and  address  deep-seated  poverty  issues.PPR  Working  Plaer Serles
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